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nerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption, such as aboriginal communities and low-income groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE is a growing concern about the inconsistencies of investment arbitration decisions in the context of economic globalization. NAFTA Chapter 11 jurisprudence is not an exception. After almost twenty years of NAFTA, the loopholes and uncertainties associated with the interpretation of, for example, the regulatory expropriation provisions have grown despite the multiple calls for consistency and legitimacy. The resolution of the inconsistencies and unpredictability associated with the application of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the difficulties in balancing foreign investors' interest and public policy is, however, not to be found solely in a self-referential reinterpretation of NAFTA provisions. Placing NAFTA Chapter 11 in context is likely to shed more light into finding solutions to the problems of legal inconsistencies and lack of proper balancing between trade and the public interest. Embedding NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions in the broader institutional environment suggests the need for recognizing, inter alia, the role of interest groups in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA provisions through arbitration and public debate. For instance, the idea of public purpose and proportionality of a measure can be socially constructed, and interest groups can develop several regulatory expropriation discourses to suit their interests, which may ultimately influence investment tribunals and regulatory decisions by governments and shape public opinion about the ideas of legitimate policies.
An interest group approach to NAFTA Chapter 11 analysis reveals the presence of competing interest groups in the development of investment arbitration. Corporate and public interest groups are central actors in such a process. In particular, given the influential role of corporate groups, an assessment of the ability of public interest groups to balance the influence of foreign investors in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 appears to be critical. While the development and role of public interest groups depend on multiple social, economic, and political factors, NAFTA rules can help promote a significant role of such groups and then contribute to a better balancing of the interest of foreign investors and the public. Specifically, non-disputing party participation rights or amici curiae are an important institution that mediates in the competition of multiple interest groups that seek to influence the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11.
This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower public interest groups that seek to protect citizen-consumers. It argues that currently amici curiae provide an extremely narrow list of participation rights to public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in many cases, result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the political role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici curiae for public interest groups in light of the potential of the latter to counter the influence of corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimizing NAFTA Chapter 11 inconsistencies and striking a more realistic balance between the public interest and foreign investors' interest. The overall impact of such expansive amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11; that is to say, public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest considerations such as human rights, environmental protection, and public health into NAFTA analyses that are likely to protect the interest of local citizen-consumers. But that requires not only greater legal powers for public interest groups, but also favorable financial and political conditions for an effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes. The argument is illustrated with a brief discussion of amici curiae in the context of anti-smoking groups and tobacco policies in Canada affecting particularly vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption, such as aboriginal communities and low-income groups.
This article is organized as follows: it first reviews the current state of amici curiae under NAFTA and raises concerns about the limited participation rights that are accorded to public interest groups. The next section argues that an expansive view of amici curiae for public interest groups is warranted in light of the advantages for minimizing the inconsistencies of NAFTA Chapter 11 and better balancing foreign investors' interest and public policy. The last section discusses the example of anti-smoking groups in Canada and the relevance of an expansive view of amici curiae, particularly for public interest groups seeking to protect vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption.
II. AMICI CURIAE AND THE LIMITED LEGAL POWER OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
Participation rights for non-disputing parties are one important mechanism that can encourage a greater role of public interest groups. This may entail a redesign of the NAFTA rules of the amici curiae institution. In Methanex Corp. v. United States, a 2001 decision on amicus curiae, 1 a tribunal proclaimed its powers to accept amicus submissions in investment arbitration for the first time 2 on the basis of its interpretation of ) , the NAFTA agreement does not limit "a Tribunal's discretion to accept written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party (a 'non-disputing party')." 4 In the Statement, the FTC recommends Tribunals to adopt a number of procedural rules concerning non-disputing party participation. While this is an important progress in the right direction, several of such recommendations restrict the ability of non-disputing parties to exert a significant influence on arbitration decisions and public debate more generally. These restrictions to the submissions of amici curiae include a short page limit, no obligation on the Tribunal to consider that submission, lack of permission for further submissions, and no access to documents: 3. The submission filed by a non-disputing party will: (b) be concise, and in no case longer than twenty typed pages, including any appendices;
9. The granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not require the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration. The granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not entitle the non-disputing party that filed the submission to make further submissions in the arbitration. 10. Access to documents by non-disputing parties that file applications under these procedures will be governed by the FTC's Note of July 31, 2001.5
It is also important to note that in the Methanex decision on amicus curiae, 6 the tribunal, while admitting non-disputing parties, 7 rejected their request to attend oral hearings of the arbitration. 8 Non-NAFTA tribunals have also rejected requests to attend oral hearings. 9 12 the NAFTA tribunal, dismissing regulatory expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims, dealt with several amicus curiae submissions by the National Mining Association, the Quechan Indian Nation, Sierra Club and Earthworks, and Friends of the Earth. Confirming its earlier decision to accept each submission, 13 the tribunal reinforced the restrictions on non-disputing parties recommended in the FTC Statement as follows:
The Tribunal expressed its view that it should apply strictly the requirements specified in the FTC Statement, for example restrictions as to length or limitations as to the matters to be addressed, but that, given the public and remedial purposes of non-disputing submissions, leave to file and acceptance of submissions should be granted 
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Clearly, those limitations of the participation rights of amici are in themselves problematic. But even such a modest list of participation rights may not materialize at all for non-disputing parties seeking to participate in arbitration. Upon a request for amicus curiae status, tribunals can deny it as they have the power and discretion, but not the duty, to allow amicus curiae.' 5 Even if tribunals do allow amicus curiae submissions, they can further restrict the participation rights of non-disputing parties. The tribunal in United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada asserted:
The power of the Tribunal to permit amicus submissions is not to be used in a way which is unduly burdensome for the parties or which unnecessarily complicates the Tribunal process. The Tribunal envisages that it will place limits on the submissions to be made in writing in terms for instance of the length. The third parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses .. .with the result that the disputing parties would not face the need to cross-examine them or call contradictory evidence ... .
6
The submissions are to relate to issues raised by the disputing parties and cannot introduce new issues in the litigation or go beyond the scope of the case as defined by the disputing parties. 17 ... The Tribunal does not expect that it will give leave to file submissions which are longer than twenty pages (including schedules).' 8
Thus, amici curiae currently offer a narrow list of legal rights to nondisputing parties to participate in NAFTA arbitrations. These legal limitations become even more problematic when such a narrow view of amici curiae is applied in the context of unorganized, financially weak, or politically disadvantaged public interest groups. Ultimately, this may result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the political role of symbolic accountability of investment arbitrations.
III. TOWARDS AN EXPANSIVE VIEW OF AMICI CURIAE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
It is therefore important to consider relaxing such restrictions and assigning more participation rights to non-disputing parties, particularly public interest groups that advocate the protection of, for instance, public quire the Tribunal to address the submission at any point in the arbitration, nor does it entitle a non-disputing party to make further submissions). 15. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., supra note 2, at paras. 63-64 (tribunals have the power-but no duty-to receive third party submissions). 16. Id. at para. 69; see also para. 73 ("The Tribunal declares that it has power to accept written amicus briefs from the Petitioners. It will consider receiving them at the merits stage of the arbitration following consultation with the parties, exercising its discretion in the way indicated in this decision." health issues like anti-smoking citizen-consumer groups. The proper defense of public health from the position of amicus may require a pleading of more than twenty pages, submissions of scientific evidence, and access to the records in order to respond to the parties' evidence and claims. Such non-disputing parties should thus have the right to make longer written submissions such as in recent decisions where the submissions were between thirty and fifty pages" as well as further written submissions and other evidence; 20 access to the evidentiary record and the disputing parties' submissions; 2 1 and the right to attend hearings and make oral submissions. In fact, most non-disputing parties have requested a similar list of participation rights in several NAFTA cases in which they were granted amicus curiae status. 22 This expansive non-disputing party participation becomes even more important for improving the consistency and public accountability of the NAFTA tribunal's decisions in light of the fact that Chapter 11 tribunals' decisions are not subject to judicial review on their merits. 
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The value of such expansive non-disputing party participation is not limited to improving the decisions of tribunals and, more generally, the transparency and the legitimacy of NAFTA arbitration mechanism, as most scholars argue. 24 It also serves to legally empower public interest groups to balance the influence of foreign investors on domestic policymaking in, and beyond, arbitration. In particular, public interest groups will be in a better position to contribute to the determination of the public purpose and the proportionality of government measures and offset the over-influence of the corporate discourse.
Past attempts by public interest groups to influence NAFTA arbitrations, even under a narrow approach to amici curiae, show the potential of non-disputing party participation. In the Methanex decision on amicus curiae, 25 The Methanex tribunal, accepting the petitions and even adopting a narrow view of amicus curiae, 28 recognized the relevance of allowing such groups to participate in a Chapter 11 arbitration in which the public interest was at stake:
There is an undoubted public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between private parties. This is not merely because benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent, or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm. 29 Interestingly, departing from Metalclad and deciding on the main issue, the Methanex tribunal held the view that the public purpose behind the regulatory measure was paramount and trumped all, making the regulation a lawful one and thus permitted under NAFTA. 30 The public purpose was decisive, finding no expropriation and no obligation to compensate. 31 Similarly, in the United Parcel Serv. decision on amicus curiae, 32 the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, seeking expansive amicus curiae rights, contended that there was a public interest in that arbitration and that they have a real interest in adding a perspective that clearly departs from the view of foreign investors:
[T]he claim raises issues of broad public interest which extend well beyond postal services to other public and social services. Further, the expansive interpretation of NAFTA urged by the Investor would dramatically expand the scope for foreign investor claims and put at risk a broad diversity of government measures that should not be vulnerable to such claims . . . . They say that they are uniquely qualified to contribute a perspective on these matters of broader public interest, a perspective which would otherwise be absent. 33
Non-NAFTA tribunals have also allowed amicus curiae participation by public interest groups 3 4 because of their potential contribution to improve the tribunal decisions on matters affecting the public interest, human rights and consumers rights. 
Aguas Argentinas, S.A. et al., Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency
and Participation as Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at para. 1.
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Comunitaria, and Uni6n de Usuarios y Consumidores. The Aguas Argentinas tribunal noted that the public interest warranted allowing NGOs to participate as amicus and recognized that non-parties can provide a perspective that can help decide a matter that will affect millions of citizen-consumers and will also have an impact on human rights: The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage systems of a large metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. Those systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, including human rights considerations. Any decision rendered in this case, whether in favor of the Claimants or the Respondent, has the potential to affect the operation of those systems and thereby the public they serve. These factors lead the Tribunal to conclude that this case does involve matters of public interest of such a nature that have traditionally led courts and other tribunals to receive amicus submissions from suitable nonparties.... Given the public interest in the subject matter of this case, it is possible that appropriate nonparties may be able to afford the Tribunal perspectives, arguments, and expertise that will help it arrive at a correct decision. . . . 36 Similarly, in Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, 3 7 five petitioners filed a petition for amicus curiae status: the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, the Center for International Environmental Law, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. 3 8 The Petitioners stated that the privatization at issue in that arbitration was conceived to work toward the goal of halving the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water; a commitment by the international community in the UN Millennium Declaration. They further claimed that the arbitration "has a substantial influence on the population's ability to enjoy basic human rights." 40 Allowing the petitioners to make limited amicus submissions, 4 1 the tribunal envisaged "that the Petitioners will address broad policy issues concerning sustainable development, environment, human rights and governmental policy." Public interest groups can also help establish the proportionality of a measure. For instance, pressure by public interest groups may be an important consideration in legitimizing bona fide, non-discriminatory regulatory measures for pressing public purposes. "In Tecmed, the tribunal reasoned that the social and political circumstances that surround a regulatory decision are also important factors in assessing the proportionality of the measure and establishing unlawful expropriation. In particular, the tribunal suggests that an otherwise expropriatory regulation will not be categorized as expropriation where it is implemented in proportional response to a serious urgent situation or social emergency." 43 A regulatory response and an urgent situation or social emergency are to some extent socially constructed, and interest groups play an important role in both constructing such a situation or emergency and pressing for a regulatory response. Thus, the presence or absence of active interest groups is likely to determine the NAFTA legitimacy of a regulatory action, as they are involved in the social construction of the response and the urgent situation or social emergency. It follows that, in the case of tobacco regulation and with an expansive amicus curiae, public interest groups advocating appropriate measures to reduce extremely high levels of tobacco consumption among, for example, aboriginal communities, may be in a stronger position to demonstrate the urgency of the situation and disseminate information about the proportionality and public purpose of a measure in and outside an arbitration.
Furthermore, expansive non-disputing party participation will reduce the chilling effect of foreign investors' use of NAFFA Chapter 11 suits. Public interest groups empowered with greater participation rights can be perceived as strong advocates of public health during all stages of arbitration, which may discourage the excessive threat of NAFTA lawsuits by foreign investors. This will create an institutional environment that favors a more balanced use of NAFTA Chapter 11 in which public policy and the interest of investors are better balanced, even without reaching arbitration. 44 Moreover, expansive non-disputing party participation is likely to induce the growth and the greater engagement of public interest groups with investment arbitrations and public debate as spheres of promoting public policy. Such groups may be encouraged by an expansive amicus curiae to seek more participation in arbitration cases, as they may feel that their views can be communicated more effectively and influentially. The possibility that amici curiae can increase the participation of public interest groups is real. In fact, it was the fear of Methanex Corporation that raised the concern to oppose the granting of a (narrow) amicus curiae status to several public interest groups in Methanex. 4 incentivize them to further engage in domestic policy and challenge the influence of corporate groups. From this perspective, amici curiae are an important legal institution that mediates in the broader competition between interest groups involved in public policy under the pressures of economic globalization. Such impact of an expansive amici will not only help fix the democratic deficit of NAFTA but will also contribute to improving the democratic nature of domestic law and policy making. The overall impact of this expansive view of amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11; that is to say, public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest considerations such as human rights, environmental protection, and public health into NAFTA analyses that are likely to protect the interest of local citizenconsumers. But the effectiveness of an expansive amicus curiae requires more than greater legal powers for public interest groups. It also needs to pay attention to the financial and political conditions that will favor the effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes.
IV. AMICI CURIAE IN CONTEXT: TOBACCO REGULATION AND COMPETING INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA
The role of public interest groups in the development of tobacco control policies in Canada provides an interesting example of the significance of the social context of amici curiae in NAFTA disputes. In particular, a close examination of the attempts to introduce plain packaging legislation in Canada and the role of competing interest groups reveals that unfavorable financial and political conditions may hinder the ability of public interest groups to participate in NAFTA disputes and policy-making generally.
There is some evidence that the tobacco industry has been engaging in several strategies to influence the meaning of NAFTA expropriation provisions and the perception and beliefs associated with what constitutes a NAFTA-based legitimate tobacco control measure as part of their broader strategies to influence tobacco consumption and its regulation in society. On "May 10, 1994, Carla Hills (on behalf of Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds) told the Standing Committee that Plain Packaging would be an infringement of GATT, NAFTA and the Paris Convention." 4 6 The plain packaging initiative in Canada ultimately failed in 1995 when the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated the Canadian Tobacco Products Control Act. 4 7 It is widely believed that RJR's NAFTA suit threat deterred the Canadian government from instituting plain packaging before the Court ruling. Similarly, Phillip Morris engaged in a campaign to oppose the attempt of Canada's government to regulate the wording of cigarette marketing. In 2001, the Canadian government proposed a regulation to "prohibit the display of 'light' and 'mild' descriptors on tobacco packaging." 4 9 Phillip Morris protested the ban on the basis of Chapter 11, arguing that "the ban would be tantamount to an expropriation of tobacco trademarks containing descriptive terms." 50 The proposed regulation was never fully developed. The threat of a NAFTA Chapter 11 lawsuit convinced Canada to abandon plain packaging with health warnings for cigarettes. 5 1
The debate over plain packaging of cigarettes has gained momentum in Canada with the recent decision of Australia's Supreme Court to uphold legislation that came into force on December 1, 2012.52 Plain packaging legislation will bar tobacco companies from displaying their brand designs, colors, and logos on cigarette packs, which will instead feature bigger health warnings and strong anti-smoking images. In Canada, the tobacco industry and anti-smoking groups have reinvigorated their opposite views. be an expropriation, inconsistent with Chapter 11 of NAFTA, saying that they had 'invested substantial sums to develop brand identity and consumer loyalty for these low yield products.' Canada has yet to impose regulations banning these terms, although a While the tobacco industry is actively influencing the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11, and appears to have succeeded in deterring plain packaging legislation, anti-smoking and other public interest groups are not necessarily in the position to exert such a degree of influence. Those groups often lack the financial resources and ability to launch massive campaigns and lobby governments for further intervention to reduce tobacco consumption.
That problem has recently become more evident with the decision of the Canadian government to cut funding for anti-smoking groups. The Non-Smokers' Rights Association, for example, is losing forty percent of its budget because of the cuts to the grants program. 56 Health groups and tobacco control advocates are, of course, appalled. Garfield Mahood, founding executive director of the Non-Smokers' Rights Association, has raised concerns about the impact of the decision, indicating that the only winner is actually Big Tobacco. 5 7 "By slashing funding to health groups, the Harper government has virtually assured that tobacco companies will have the upper hand in influencing federal policy decisions. Most concerning is that these funding cuts may undermine anti-smoking organizations that seek to represent vulnerable groups with high tobacco consumption rates. For instance, smoking rates are very high among aboriginal populations. "Tobacco-related illnesses and diseases are urgent issues in First Nations and Inuit communities, where smoking rates are more than triple the rate for the rest of Canada." 60 Similar concerns are expressed for other groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption like youth, ethnic minorities, and the poor. 6 1 This should not be surprising because "smoking is now clearly associated with disadvantage and inequity." 62 Although approximately twenty percent of the Canadian population smokes, certain subpopulations have higher prevalence, including Aboriginals and the poor and homeless. 63 Recent estimates indicate that the smoking rate in Canada's aboriginal population is close to fifty percent.64 Despite the general funding cuts to health groups, there will still be $7 million in this year's $38 million budget for grants and contributions to health groups, but the government intends to direct that money mostly to aboriginal groups, 65 which reportedly will be the new focus of the anti-smoking program. 6 6 But, in 2006 the government "suspended" $10 million in annual funding for the First Nations and Inuit Tobacco Control Strategy. 67 Groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption may need organized representation and involvement in advocacy to promote favorable tobacco control policies. But they have also been financially weakened by funding cuts for anti-smoking groups. Recent general funding cuts are further weakening the ability of such groups to advocate, inter alia, tobacco policies that meet their needs. For instance, the government is drastically reducing general funding for aboriginal communities. "The core funding of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations will be cut to $500,000 per year from the current $1.6 million by 2013-14. Tribal councils will face cuts of 20 to 40 percent. The Metis Nation -Saskatchewan . . . is also being cut." 6 8 First Nations in Northern Ontario are currently preparing for looming federal funding cuts and caps that could slash their budgets in half.
6 9 First Nations leaders believe that such funding cuts seek to weaken their capacity to deal with environmental assessments, companies, and business agreements. 70 The interest and voice of groups with high rates of tobacco consumption are thus likely to be both underrepresented in tobacco policy-making and debilitated for defending a favorable policy from NAFTA challenges. In such a context, it will be easier for governments to continue neglecting the needs of those groups and for the tobacco industry to expand its influence on NAFTA-based tobacco policies and its market share associated with such groups. For example, tobacco advertising received via U.S. media sources increasingly targets vulnerable groups such as youth, women, ethnocultural groups, and gays and lesbians. 7 '
Thus, anti-smoking groups are not only financially and politically disadvantaged, but also their current legal rights to participate as amicus curiae in NAFIA arbitrations are severely limited. This censors their views and influence, which in turn worsens the public accountability of NAFTA arbitration and further empowers the views of foreign investors to the detriment of the public interest. It is difficult to expect a significant improvement in the balancing of foreign investors' interest and public policy, and more generally, in the democratic nature of policy-making. Given the erosion of the financial basis of public interest groups and the modest rights of non-disputing parties, amici curiae is of little help for that kind of group and rather plays the symbolic role of legitimizing the predominance of trade and foreign investors' interest by giving the appearance of public accountability.
While expansive amici curiae appear to be important for anti-smoking groups in the context of defending a policy from NAFTA challenges in and beyond an arbitration, the economic and political conditions for public interest groups to participate in NAFTA disputes should not be underestimated. Indeed, an amicus curiae institution may provide broader participation rights, but the lack of financial or political resources may prevent civil society groups from effectively participating in NAFTA disputes as amicus curiae. A defragmentation project seeking to protect local citizen-consumers via amici curiae thus requires not only a facilitative legal framework, but also financially and politically strong public interest groups capable of advocating the public interest in the face of influential corporate discourses. Moreover, considerations should be given to the need to develop a duty of governments and foreign investors to not interfere with the growth of relevant public interest groups that are likely to participate as non-disputing parties in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes. This might include the government's obligation to provide basic funding for public interest groups working in the area of, for example, public health.
V. CONCLUSION
Concerns about the inconsistency and unpredictability associated with the application of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the difficulties in balancing foreign investors' interest and public policy are common and unresolved. The institutional environment suggests that interest groups also play a role in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFIA Chapter 11 through arbitration and public debate. This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower public interest groups such as citizen-consumer groups. It argued that currently amici curiae provide an extremely narrow list of participation rights to public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in many cases, result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the political role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici curiae for public interest groups in light of the their potential to counter the influence of corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimizing the NAFTA Chapter 11 inconsistencies and striking a more realistic balance between the public interest and foreign investors' interest. Ultimately, such a view of amici curiae is likely to help defragment NAFTA Chapter 11, as public interest groups will be in a stronger position to introduce considerations other than trade and foreign investors' economic interest, provided favorable financial and political conditions. A brief discussion of amici curiae in the context of anti-smoking groups in Canada provided a good example of the potential and limits of an expansive view of amici curiae. Further investigation is needed to establish more precisely the extent to which public interest groups can influence NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration decisions under an expansive regime of amici curiae.
